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Abstract
In this work, we study an equilibrium-based continuous asset pricing problem which
seeks to form a price process endogenously by requiring it to balance the flow of sales-and-
purchase orders in the exchange market, where a large number of agents 1 ≤ i ≤ N are
interacting through the market price. Adopting a mean field game (MFG) approach, we find
a special form of forward-backward stochastic differential equations of McKean-Vlasov type
with common noise whose solution provides a good approximate of the market price. We
show the convergence of the net order flow to zero in the large N -limit and get the order of
convergence in N under some conditions. We also extend the model to a setup with multiple
populations where the agents within each population share the same cost and coefficient
functions but they can be different population by population.
Keywords : FBSDE of McKean-Vlasov type, common noise, general equilibrium
1 Introduction
One of the most important problems in the financial economics is to understand how the asset
price processes are formed through the interaction among a large number of rational competitive
agents. In this paper, using a stylized model of security exchange, we try to explicitly form an
approximate market price process which balances the flow of sales-and-purchase orders from a
large number of rational financial institutions. If we directly force the price process to balance
the net order flow, the strategies of the agents become strongly coupled and the problem is
hardly solvable. In fact, it is even unclear how to make the cost functions of the agents well-
defined, since the market price results in a very complicated recursive functional of strategies of
all the agents that makes it difficult to guarantee the convexity of the cost functions. In order
to circumvent this problem, we make use of the recent developments of mean field games.
Since its inception brought by the pioneering works of Lasry & Lions [20, 21, 22] and Huang,
Malhame & Caines [18], mean field game has rapidly developed into one of the most actively
studied topics in the field of probability theory, applied mathematics, engineering, finance and
economics. The greatest strength of the mean field game approach is to render notoriously
∗All the contents expressed in this research are solely those of the author and do not represent any views or
opinions of any institutions. The author is not responsible or liable in any manner for any losses and/or damages
caused by the use of any contents in this research.
†Quantitative Finance Course, Graduate School of Economics, The University of Tokyo.
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difficult problems of stochastic differential games among many agents tractable by transforming
it to a simpler form of stochastic control problem. There exist two approaches to the mean field
games, one is analytic approach using partial differential equations (PDEs), and the others is
probabilistic approach based on forward-backward stochastic differential equations (FBSDEs).
For details of analytic approach and its applications, the interested readers may consult the
works of Bensousssan, Frehse & Yam [3], Gomes, Nurbekyan & Pimentel [14], Achdou et.al. [1],
Gomes, Pimentel & Voskanyan [15] and also Kolokoltsov & Malafeyev [19]. On the other hand,
the probabilistic approach was developed by the series of works of Carmona & Delarue [4, 5, 6]
and the recent two volumes of monograph [7, 8] provide its full mathematical details and many
references for a wide array of applications of mean field games.
Interestingly, from the perspective of equilibrium asset pricing, the number of applications
of mean field games is quite limited. In most of the existing literature, the authors have given a
response function of the price process exogenously and searched an approximate Nash equilib-
rium among agents. See, for example, applications to optimal portfolio liquidation, exploitation
of exhaustible resources among many agents and related issues [10, 11, 12], or an application
to electricity pricing with smart grids [2, 9]. In the work [17], the authors treat explicitly the
balance of demand and supply in the oil market, but the demand is exogenously given as a
function of the oil price. One notable exception is the work of Gomes & Saude [16], in which the
authors explicitly force demand and supply to balance and endogenously construct the market
clearing electricity price. They use the analytic approach and the resultant equilibrium price
process becomes deterministic due to the absence of common noise.
In the current paper, we extend the work [16] by adopting the probabilistic approach. In
order to understand the price processes, in particular those of financial assets, including sys-
temic signals which impacts all the agents is crucially important. We find an interesting form of
FBSDEs of McKean-Vlasov type with common noise as a limit problem. Although it involves
dependence in conditional law, it only appears as a conditional expectation. This allows us to
adopt the well-known Peng-Wu’s continuation method [23] to prove the existence of a unique
strong solution. The resultant candidate of the market price process is derived completely en-
dogenously by the optimal trading strategies of the agents facing systemic information (including
securities’ coupon stream) as well as idiosyncratic noise. Another benefit of probabilistic ap-
proach is that it allows us to quantify the relation between the actual game with finite number
of agents and its large population limit. In a similar manner to the standard mean field games
in proving ε-Nash equilibrium, we show that the solution of the mean-field limit problem ac-
tually provides asymptotic market clearing in the large-N limit. Under additional integrability
conditions, Glivenko-Cantelli convergence theorem in the Wasserstein distance even provides a
specific order of convergence in terms of the number of agents N . We also discuss the extension
of the model to the situation with multiple populations where the agents share the same cost and
coefficient functions within each population but they can be different population by population.
This will provide an important tool to study the price formation in the presence of different type
of agents such as Buy-side and Sell-side institutions, for example.
The organization of the paper is as follows: After explaining the notation in Section 2, we
give an intuitive derivation of the limit problem from the game of finite number of agents in
Section 3, which motivates the readers to study the special type of FBSDEs of MKV-type. The
solvability of the FBSDE is studied in Section 4. Using the derived regularity of the solution,
we prove the asymptotic market clearing in Section 5. In Section 6, we discuss the extension
of the model to the setup with multiple populations. Finally, in Section 7, we give concluding
remarks. We discuss further extensions of the model and future directions of research.
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2 Notation
We introduce (N+1) complete probability spaces:
(Ω
0
,F
0
,P
0
) and (Ω
i
,F
i
,P
i
)Ni=1 ,
endowed with filtrations F
i
:= (F
i
t)t≥0, i ∈ {0, · · · , N}. Here, F
0
is the completion of the
filtration generated by d0-dimensional Brownian motion W 0 (hence right-continuous) and, for
each i ∈ {1, · · · , N}, F
i
is the complete and right-continuous augmentation of the filtration
generated by d-dimensional Brownian motions W i as well as a W i-independent n-dimensional
square-integrable random variables (ξi). (ξi)Ni=1 are supposed to have the same law. We also
introduce the product probability spaces
Ωi = Ω
0
× Ω
i
, F i, Fi = (F it )t≥0, P
i , i ∈ {1, · · · , N}
where (F i,Pi) is the completion of (F
0
⊗ F
i
,P
0
⊗ P
i
) and Fi is the complete and right-
continuous augmentation of (F
0
t ⊗ F
i
t)t≥0. In the same way, we define the complete proba-
bility space (Ω,F ,P) endowed with F = (Ft)t≥0 satisfying the usual conditions as a product of
(Ω
i
,F
i
,P
i
;F
i
)Ni=0.
Throughout the work, the symbol L denotes a given positive constant, the symbol C a
general positive constant which may change line by line. When we want to emphasize that C
depends only on some specific variables, say a and b, we use the symbol C(a, b). For a given
constant T > 0, we use the following notation for frequently encountered spaces:
• L2(G;Rd) denotes the set of Rd-valued G-measurable square integrable random variables.
• S2(G;Rd) is the set of Rd-valued G-adapted continuous processes X satisfying
||X||S2 := E
[
sup
t∈[0,T ]
|Xt|
2
] 1
2 <∞ .
• H2(G;Rd) is the set of Rd-valued G-progressively measurable processes Z satisfying
||Z||H2 := E
[(∫ T
0
|Zt|
2dt
)] 1
2
<∞ .
• L(X) denotes the law of a random variable X.
• P(Rd) is the set of probability measures on (Rd,B(Rd)).
• Pp(R
d) with p ≥ 1 is the subset of P(Rd) with finite p-th moment; i.e., the set of µ ∈ P(Rd)
satisfying
Mp(µ) :=
(∫
Rd
|x|pµ(dx)
) 1
p
<∞ .
We always assign Pp(R
d) with (p ≥ 1) the p-Wasserstein distance Wp, which makes Pp(R
d) a
complete separable metric space. As an important property, for any µ, ν ∈ Pp(R
d), we have
Wp(µ, ν) = inf
{
E[|X − Y |p]
1
p ;L(X) = µ,L(Y ) = ν
}
, (2.1)
where “inf” is taken over all random variables with laws equal to µ and ν, respectively. For
3
more details, see Chapter 5 in [7]. We frequently omit the arguments such as (G,Rd) in the
above definitions when there is no confusion from the context.
3 Intuitive Derivation of the Mean Field Problem
In this section, in order to introduce the special form of forward-backward stochastic differential
equations of McKean-Vlasov type to be studied in this paper, we give a heuristic derivation of
the mean-field limit problem from the corresponding equilibrium problem with finite number of
agents. As a motivating example, we consider the equilibrium-based pricing problem of n types
of securities, which are continuously traded in the security exchange in the presence of a large
number of participating agents indexed by i ∈ {1, · · · , N}. Every agent is supposed to have
many small clients who can only trade directly to the agent via over-the-counter markets (OTC)
and have no access to the security exchange.
We suppose that each agent i ∈ {1, · · · , N} tries to solve the problem
inf
α
i∈Ai
J i(αi) (3.1)
with some cost functional
J i(αi) := E
[∫ T
0
f(t,Xit , α
i
t,̟t, c
0
t , c
i
t)dt+ g(X
i
T ,̟T , c
0
T , c
i
T )
]
,
subject to the dynamic constraint:
dXit =
(
αit + l(t,̟t, c
0
t , c
i
t)
)
dt+ σ0(t,̟t, c
0
t , c
i
t)dW
0
t + σ(t,̟t, c
0
t , c
i
t)dW
i
t
with Xi0 = ξ
i ∈ L2(F
i
0;R
n). Here, (Xit)t≥0 is an R
n-valued process denoting the time-t position
of the n securities for the agent i with the initial position ξi. (c0t )t≥0 ∈ H
2(F
0
;Rn) denotes
the coupon payments from the securities or the market news commonly available to all the
agents, while (cit)t≥0 ∈ H
2(F
i
;Rn) denotes some independent factors affecting only on the agent
i. Moreover, (cit)t≥0 are also assumed to have the common law for all 1 ≤ i ≤ N . We further
suppose c0T and c
i
T are square integrable to handle the terminal cost g. Each agent controls
(αit)t≥0 denoting the trading speed though the security exchange. The remaining terms (l, σ0, σ)
denote the order flow to the agent from his/her clients through OTC markets. (̟t)t≥0 is the
market price of the n securities. The space of admissible strategies Ai of the agent i is the
set of processes (αit)t≥0 adapted to the complete right-continuous augmentation of the filtration(
σ{̟s : s ≤ t}) ∨ F
i
t
)
t≥0
satisfying
E
∫ T
0
|αit|
2dt <∞ .
In contrast to the standard optimization problems with a given market price process, we want
to understand the fundamental mechanism of financial market which determines the market
price by the equilibrium condition. The equilibrium price (̟t)t≥0 adapted to the filtration F is
determined endogenously so that the optimal strategies of the agents (α̂it)
N
i=1 satisfy the market
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clearing condition for every t ∈ [0, T ], P-a.s.
N∑
i=1
α̂it = 0 , (3.2)
which denotes the balance point of demand and supply at the security exchange.
Although we have already made simplistic assumptions such that the cost functions as well
as the coefficient functions of all the agents are common, the problem is still hardly solvable.
Due to the clearing condition (3.2), we cannot adopt an open-loop equilibrium approach. In
particular, (̟t)t≥0 becomes a complicated functional of the agents’ trading strategies and hence
the problem for each agent is highly recursive with respect to (αit)t≥0,1≤i≤N . It is even unclear
how to guarantee the cost function well-defined by making it convex with respect to the controls.
In order to obtain some insight, let us consider a much simpler situation. It is natural
to suppose that the impact to the market price (̟t)t∈[0,T ] from the individual agent becomes
negligibly small when N is sufficiently large. Moreover, (̟t)t∈[0,T ] is likely to be given by F
0
-
progressively measurable process since the effects from the idiosyncratic parts from many agents
are expected to be canceled out. If this is the case, the problem for each agent reduces to the
standard stochastic optimal control problem in a given random environment (̟t, c
0
t , c
i
t)t∈[0,T ]
with Fi-adapted trading strategy (αit)t∈[0,T ]. Let us first investigate this simple problem in
details. We introduce the cost functions: f : [0, T ] × (Rn)5 → R, g : (Rn)4 → R, f : [0, T ] ×
(Rn)4 → R and g : (Rn)3 → R, which are measurable functions such that
f(t, x, α,̟, c0, c) := 〈̟,α〉 +
1
2
〈α,Λα〉 + f(t, x,̟, c0, c),
g(x,̟, c0, c) := −δ〈̟,x〉+ g(x, c0, c) .
Assumption 3.1. (MFG-a)
(i) Λ is a positive definite n × n symmetric matrix with λIn×n ≤ Λ ≤ λIn×n in the sense of
2nd-order form where λ and λ are some constants satisfying 0 < λ ≤ λ.
(ii) For any (t, x,̟, c0, c),
|f(t, x,̟, c0, c)| + |g(x, c0, c)| ≤ L(1 + |x|2 + |̟|2 + |c0|2 + |c|2) .
(iii) f and g are continuously differentiable in x and satisfy, for any (t, x, x′,̟, c0, c),
|∂xf(t, x
′,̟, c0, c)− ∂xf(t, x,̟, c
0, c)| + |∂xg(x
′, c0, c)− ∂xg(x, c
0, c)| ≤ L|x′ − x| ,
and |∂xf(t, x,̟, c
0, c)| + |∂xg(x, c
0, c)| ≤ L(1 + |x|+ |̟|+ |c0|+ |c|).
(iv)The functions f and g are convex in x in the sense that for any (t, x, x′,̟, c0, c),
f(t, x′,̟, c0, c)− f(t, x,̟, c0, c)− 〈x′ − x, ∂xf(t, x,̟, c
0, c)〉 ≥
γf
2
|x′ − x|2 ,
g(x′, c0, c)− g(x, c0, c) − 〈x′ − x, ∂xg(x, c
0, c)〉 ≥
γg
2
|x′ − x|2 ,
with some constants γf , γg ≥ 0.
(v) l, σ0, σ are the measurable functions defined on [0, T ] × (R
n)3 and are Rn,Rn×d
0
and Rn×d-
5
valued, respectively. Moreover they satisfy the linear growth condition:
|(l, σ0, σ)(t,̟, c
0, c)| ≤ L(1 + |̟|+ |c0|+ |c|)
for any (t,̟, c0, c).
(vi) δ ∈ [0, 1) is a given constant.
The first term 〈̟,α〉 of f denotes the direct cost incurred by the sales and purchase of the
securities and the second term 12 〈α,Λα〉 is some fee to be paid to the exchange depending on
the trading speed, or may be interpreted as some internal cost. The first term of g denotes the
mark-to-market value at the closing time with some discount factor δ < 1.1 f and g denote the
running as well as the terminal cost which are affected by the market price, coupon streams, or
the news.
Remark 3.1. If we think c0 as a coupon stream of the securities, one may consider for example,
f(t, x,̟, c0, c) = −〈c0, x〉+ f
′
(t, x,̟, c)
as a running cost with an appropriate measurable function f
′
. For securities with a given ma-
turity T with exogenously specified payoff c0, such as bonds and futures, it is natural to consider
g(x, c0) = g(x, c0) = −〈c0, x〉
as the terminal cost.
For this problem, the (reduced) Hamiltonian is given by
H(t, x, y, α,̟, c0, c) = 〈y, α+ l(t,̟, c0, c)〉 + f(t, x, α,̟, c0, c) .
Since ∂αH(t, x, y, α,̟, c
0, c) = y +̟ + Λα, the minimizer of the Hamiltonian is
α̂(y,̟) := −Λ(y +̟) (3.3)
where Λ := Λ−1. The adjoint FBSDE associated with the stochastic maximal principle for each
agent 1 ≤ i ≤ N is thus given by,
dXit =
(
α̂(Y it ,̟t) + l(t,̟t, c
0
t , c
i
t)
)
dt+ σ0(t,̟t, c
0
t , c
i
t)dW
0
t + σ(t,̟t, c
0
t , c
i
t)dW
i
t ,
dY it = −∂xf(t,X
i
t ,̟t, c
0
t , c
i
t)dt+ Z
i,0
t dW
0
t + Z
i
tdW
i
t , (3.4)
with Xi0 = ξ
i and Y iT = ∂xg(X
i
T ,̟T , c
0
T , c
i
T ).
Theorem 3.1. Under Assumption (MFG-a) and a given (̟t)t∈[0,T ] ∈ H
2(F
0
;Rn), the problem
(3.1) for each agent is uniquely characterized by the FBSDE (3.4) which is strongly solvable with
a unique solution (Xi, Y i, Zi,0, Zi) ∈ S2(Fi;Rn)× S2(Fi;Rn)×H2(Fi;Rn×d
0
)×H2(Fi;Rn×d).
Proof. Since the cost functions are jointly convex with (x, α) and strictly convex in α, the
problem is the special situation investigated in Section 1.4.4 in [8]. Note that, in our case, the
diffusion terms σ0, σ are independent of (X
i, αi). The proof is the direct result of Theorem 1.60
in the same reference.
1We shall see that the condition δ < 1 is necessary to obtain well-defined terminal condition for the limit
problem.
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Using the above solution, the optimal strategy of each agent is given by
α̂it = −Λ(Y
i
t +̟t), t ∈ [0, T ] .
Let us check the market clearing condition. In the current situation, (3.2) is equivalent to
̟t = −
1
N
N∑
i=1
Y it
which is of course inconsistent with the our simplifying assumption that requires (̟t)t≥0 to be an
F
0
-adapted process. However, in the current setup, for any t ∈ [0, T ], (Y it )
N
i=1 are exchangeable
random variables due to the construction of the probability space, common coefficient functions,
and the fact that (ξi)Ni=1 as well as (c
i
t, t ∈ [0, T ])
N
i=1 are assumed to be i.i.d. Thus De Finetti’s
theory of exchangeable sequence of random variables tells,
lim
N→∞
1
N
N∑
i=1
Y it = E
[
Y 1t |
⋂
k≥1
σ{Y jt , j ≥ k}
]
a.s.
See for example Theorem 2.1 in [8]. It also seems natural to expect that the tail σ-field is reduced
to F
0
t . Therefore we can expect that, in the large-N limit, the market price of the securities
may be given by ̟t = −E[Y
1
t |F
0
t ].
The above observation motivates us to consider the following FBSDE:
dXt =
(
α̂
(
Yt,−E[Yt|F
0
t ]
)
+ l
(
t,−E[Yt|F
0
t ], c
0
t , ct
))
dt
+σ0
(
t,−E[Yt|F
0
t ], c
0
t , ct
)
dW 0t + σ
(
t,−E[Yt|F
0
t ], c
0
t , ct
)
dW 1t ,
dYt = −∂xf
(
t,Xt,−E[Yt|F
0
t ], c
0
t , ct
)
dt+ Z0t dW
0
t + ZtdW
1
t ,
with X0 = ξ with YT =
δ
1− δ
E
[
∂xg(XT , c
0
T , cT )|F
0
T
]
+∂xg(XT , c
0
T , cT ). To simplify the notation,
we have omitted the superscript 1 from Y 1, X1, ξ1 and c1. Let us remark on the terminal
condition. YT = ∂xg(XT ,−E[YT |F
0
T ], c
0
T , cT ) is not yet fully specified. Taking the conditional
expectation in the both sides gives
E[YT |F
0
T ] = δE[YT |F
0
T ] + E
[
∂xg(XT , c
0
T , cT )|F
0
T
]
,
which implies E[YT |F
0
T ] =
1
1−δE
[
∂xg(XT , c
0
T , cT )|F
0
T
]
. Substituting this expression for E[YT |F
0
T ]
in ∂xg, we get the above specification of the terminal condition.
This is the FBSDE we are going to study in the following. It is of McKean-Vlasov type
with common noise, and similar to the FBSDEs relevant for the extended mean field games.
In the following, we are going to prove the existence of a unique solution to the above FBSDE
under appropriate conditions and then show that −E[Yt|F
0
t ] is actually a good approximate of
the market price by investigating how accurately it achieves the market clearing condition (3.2)
when N increases.
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4 Solvability of the mean-field FBSDE
We now investigate the solvability of the FBSDE derived in the last section
dXt =
(
α̂
(
Yt,−E[Yt|F
0
t ]
)
+ l
(
t,−E[Yt|F
0
t ], c
0
t , ct
))
dt
+σ0
(
t,−E[Yt|F
0
t ], c
0
t , ct
)
dW 0t + σ
(
t,−E[Yt|F
0
t ], c
0
t , ct
)
dW 1t ,
dYt = −∂xf
(
t,Xt,−E[Yt|F
0
t ], c
0
t , ct
)
dt+ Z0t dW
0
t + ZtdW
1
t , (4.1)
with X0 = ξ with YT =
δ
1− δ
E
[
∂xg(XT , c
0
T , cT )|F
0
T
]
+ ∂xg(XT , c
0
T , cT ). α̂ is defined as in (3.3).
(c0t )t≥0 ∈ H
2(F
0
;Rn) and (ct)t≥0 ∈ H
2(F
1
;Rn) with square integrable c0T , cT are given as inputs.
Let us remind the notation to write ξ = ξ1 and c = c1.
4.1 Unique existence for small T
Assumption 4.1. (MFG-b)
For any (t, x, c0, c) ∈ [0, T ] × (Rn)3 and any ̟,̟′ ∈ Rn, the coefficient functions l, σ0, σ and f
satisfy
|(l, σ0, σ)(t,̟, c
0, c)− (l, σ0, σ)(t,̟
′, c0, c)| + |∂xf(t, x,̟, c
0, c) − ∂xf(t, x,̟
′, c0, c)| ≤ L|̟ −̟′| .
Due to the Lipschitz continuity and the absence of (Z0, Z) in the diffusion coefficients of the
forward SDE, we have the following short-term existence result.
Theorem 4.1. Under Assumptions (MFG-a,b), there exists some constant τ > 0 which depends
only on (L, λ, δ) such that for any T ≤ τ , there exists a unique strong solution (X,Y,Z0, Z) ∈
S
2(F1;Rn)× S2(F1;Rn)×H2(F1;Rn×d
0
)×H2(F1;Rn×d) to the FBSDE (4.1).
Proof. Although there exist terms involving E[Yt|F
0
t ], one can adopt the standard technique for
the Lipschitz FBSDE. See, for example, the proof of Theorem 1.45 [8].
4.2 Unique existence for general T
In order to obtain existence result for general T , we are going to apply the technique developed
by Peng & Wu [23]. In the case of the standard optimization problem, the joint convexity in the
state and control variables combined with strict convexity in the control variable are enough to
obtain the unique existence. Interestingly however, we need a strict convexity also in the state
variable X in our problem. As we shall see, this is because the term −E[Yt|F
0
t ] which appears
due to the clearing condition weakens the convexity.
Assumption 4.2. (MFG-c1)
(i) The functions f , σ0 and σ are independent of the argument ̟.
(ii) For any t ∈ [0, T ], any random variables x, x′, c0, c ∈ L2(F ;Rn) and any sub-σ-field G ⊂ F ,
the function l satisfies the monotone condition:
E
[
〈l(t,E[x|G], c0, c) − l(t,E[x′|G], c0, c), x − x′〉
]
≥ 0 .
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(iii) There exists a strictly positive constant γ with 0 < γ ≤ γf ∧ γg. Moreover, for any
x, x′, c0, c ∈ L2(F ;Rn) and any sub-σ-field G ⊂ F , the function g satisfies
γgE[|x− x′|2] +
δ
1− δ
E
[
〈E
[
∂xg(x, c
0, c)− ∂xg(x
′, c0, c)|G
]
, x− x′〉
]
≥ γE[|x− x′|2] .
Remark 4.1. If l and ∂xg have separable forms such as h(x) + h
c(c0, c) with some functions h
and hc, then the conditions (ii) and (iii) are satisfied when the function h is monotone.
The next theorem is the first main existence result.
Theorem 4.2. Under Assumptions (MFG-a,b,c1), there exists a unique strong solution (X,Y,Z0, Z) ∈
S
2(F1;Rn)× S2(F1;Rn)×H2(F1;Rn×d
0
)×H2(F1;Rn×d) to the FBSDE (4.1).
Proof. In order to simplify the notation, let us define the functionals B,G for any y, x, c0, c ∈
L
2(F ;Rn) by
B(t, y, c0, c) :=
(
−Λ(y − E[y|F
0
t ]) + l(t,−E[y|F
0
t ], c
0, c)
)
,
G(x, c0, c) :=
δ
1− δ
E
[
∂xg(x, c
0, c)|F
0
T
]
+ ∂xg(x, c
0, c) . (4.2)
With the convention ∆y := y − y′, ∆x := x− x′, one can easily confirms
E
[
〈B(t, y, c0, c)−B(t, y′, c0, c),∆y〉
]
≤ 0 ,
E
[
〈G(x, c0, c)−G(x′, c0, c),∆x〉
]
≥ γE[|∆x|2],
E
[
〈−(∂xf(t, x, c
0, c)− ∂xf(t, x
′, c0, c)),∆x〉
]
≤ −γE[|∆x|2] , (4.3)
where the first estimate follows from (MFG-c1)(ii) and Jensen’s inequality, the others are the
direct consequence of (MFG-c1) (i) and (iii).2
We first make the following hypothesis: there exists some constant ̺ ∈ [0, 1) such that,
for any (Ibt )t≥0, (I
f
t )t≥0 in H
2(F1;Rn) and any η ∈ L2(F1T ;R
n), there exists a unique solution
(x̺, y̺, z0,̺, z̺) ∈ S2(F1;Rn)× S2(F1;Rn)×H2(F1;Rn×d
0
)×H2(F1;Rn×d) to the FBSDE:
dx̺t =
(
̺B(t, y̺t , c
0
t , ct) + I
b
t
)
dt+ σ0(t, c
0
t , ct)dW
0
t + σ(t, c
0
t , ct)dW
1
t ,
dy̺t = −
(
(1− ̺)γx̺t + ̺∂xf(t, x
̺
t , c
0
t , ct) + I
f
t
)
dt+ z0,̺t dW
0
t + z
̺
t dW
1
t , (4.4)
with x̺0 = ξ and y
̺
T = ̺G(x
̺
T , c
0
T , cT )+(1−̺)x
̺
T +η. Note that when ̺ = 0 we have a decoupled
set of SDE and BSDE and hence the hypothesis trivially holds. Our goal is to extend the ̺
up to 1 by following Peng-Wu’s continuation method [23]. Now, for an arbitrary set of inputs
(x, y, z0, z) ∈ S2(F1;Rn)2 ×H2(F1;Rn×d
0
)×H2(F1;Rn×d) and constant ζ ∈ (0, 1), consider
dXt =
[
̺B(t, Yt, c
0
t , ct) + ζB(t, yt, c
0
t , ct) + I
b
t
]
dt+ σ0(t, c
0
t , ct)dW
0
t + σ(t, c
0
t , ct)dW
1
t ,
dYt = −
[
(1− ̺)γXt + ̺∂xf(t,Xt, c
0
t , ct) + ζ(−γxt + ∂xf(t, xt, c
0
t , ct)) + I
f
t
]
dt
+Z0,̺t dW
0
t + ZtdW
1
t , (4.5)
2Under the setup used for Theorem 3.1, the first quantity would be bounded by −(λ)−1|∆y|2. This strict
monotone condition is not available due to the presence of E[∆y|F
0
t ] terms.
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with X0 = ξ and YT = ̺G(XT , c
0
T , cT ) + (1 − ̺)XT + ζ(G(xT , c
0
T , cT )− xT ) + η. The existence
of the solution (X,Y,Z0, Z) ∈ S2 × S2 ×H2 ×H2 is guaranteed by the previous hypothesis. We
are going to prove the map (x, y, z0, z) 7→ (X,Y,Z0, Z) defined above becomes strict contraction
when ζ > 0 is chosen small enough.
For two set of inputs (x, y, z0, z) and (x′, y′, z0′, z′), let us denote the corresponding solutions
to (4.5) by (X,Y,Z0, Z) and (X ′, Y ′, Z0′, Z ′), respectively. We put ∆Xt := Xt − X
′
t, ∆Yt :=
Yt−Y
′
t and similarly for the others. Applying Itoˆ’s formula to 〈∆Xt,∆Yt〉 and using the estimates
(4.3), we obtain
E
[
〈∆XT ,∆YT 〉
]
≤ −γE
∫ T
0
|∆Xt|
2dt+ ζCE
∫ T
0
[
|∆Yt|(|∆yt|+ E[∆yt|F
0
t ]) + |∆Xt||∆xt|
]
dt ,
E
[
〈∆XT ,∆YT 〉
]
≥ (̺γ + (1− ̺))E[|∆XT |
2]− ζCE
[
|∆XT |(|∆xT |+ E[|∆xT ||F
0
T ])
]
,
where C = C(L,Λ). Let us set γc := min(1, γ) > 0. Then one easily confirms 0 < γc ≤ ̺γ+(1−̺)
for any ̺ ∈ [0, 1). Then the above estimates yields
γcE
[
|∆XT |
2 +
∫ T
0
|∆Xt|
2dt
]
≤ ζCE
[
|∆XT |(|∆xT |+ E[|∆xT ||F
0
T ])
]
+ζCE
∫ T
0
[
|∆Yt|(|∆yt|+ E[∆yt|F
0
t ]) + |∆Xt||∆xt|
]
dt .
Using Young’s inequality and and a new constant C, we get
E[|∆XT |
2] + E
∫ T
0
|∆Xt|
2dtd ≤ ζCE
∫ T
0
(
|∆Yt|
2 + (|∆xt|
2 + |∆yt|
2)
)
dt+ ζCE[|∆xT |
2] . (4.6)
Treating X,X ′ as inputs, the standard estimates for the Lipschitz BSDEs (see, for example,
Theorem 4.2.3 in [24]) gives
E
[
sup
t∈[0,T ]
|∆Yt|
2 +
∫ T
0
(|∆Z0t |
2 + |∆Zt|
2)dt
]
≤ CE
[
|∆XT |
2 +
∫ T
0
|∆Xt|
2dt
]
+ ζCE
[
|∆xT |
2 +
∫ T
0
|∆xt|
2dt
]
.
Combining with (4.6) and choosing ζ > 0 small, we obtain
E
[
sup
t∈[0,T ]
|∆Yt|
2 +
∫ T
0
(|∆Z0t |
2 + |∆Zt|
2)dt
]
≤ ζCE
[
|∆xT |
2 +
∫ T
0
(|∆xt|
2 + |∆yt|
2)dt
]
. (4.7)
By the similar procedures, we also have
E
[
sup
t∈[0,T ]
|∆Xt|
2
]
≤ ζCE
[
|∆xT |
2 +
∫ T
0
(|∆xt|
2 + |∆yt|
2)dt
]
. (4.8)
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From (4.7) and (4.8), we obtain with C = C(L,Λ, γc, T ),
E
[
sup
t∈[0,T ]
|∆Xt|
2 + sup
t∈[0,T ]
|∆Yt|
2 +
∫ T
0
(|∆Z0t |
2 + |∆Zt|
2)dt
]
≤ ζCE
[
sup
t∈[0,T ]
|∆xt|
2 + sup
t∈[0,T ]
|∆yt|
2 +
∫ T
0
(|∆z0t |
2 + |∆zt|
2)dt
]
.
Thus there exists ζ > 0, being independent of the size of ̺, that makes the map (x, y, z0, z) 7→
(X,Y,Z0, Z) strict contraction. Therefore the initial hypothesis holds true for (̺ + ζ), which
establishes the claim of the theorem.
Proposition 4.1. Given two set of inputs (ξ, c0, c), (ξ′, c0′, c′), coefficients (δ,Λ), (δ′ ,Λ′) and the
coefficient functions (l, σ0, σ, f , g), (l
′, σ′0, σ
′, f
′
, g′) satisfying Assumptions (MFG-a,b,c1), let us
denote the corresponding solutions to (4.1) by (X,Y,Z0, Z) and (X ′, Y ′, Z0′, Z ′), respectively.
We also define the functionals (B,G)and (B′, G′) by (4.2) with corresponding coefficients, re-
spectively. Then, we have the following stability result:
E
[
sup
t∈[0,T ]
|∆Xt|
2 + sup
t∈[0,T ]
|∆Yt|
2 +
∫ T
0
(|∆Z0t |
2 + |∆Zt|
2)dt
]
≤ CE
[
|∆ξ|2 + |G|2 +
∫ T
0
(
|∂xf(t)|
2 + |B(t)|2 + |σ0(t)|
2 + |σ(t)|2
)
dt
]
,
where C is a constant depending only on T as well as the Lipschitz constants of the system, and
B(t) := B(t, Y ′t , c
0
t , ct)−B
′(t, Y ′t , c
0′
t , c
′
t),
(σ0, σ)(t) = (σ0(t, c
0
t , ct)− σ
′
0(t, c
0′
t , c
′
t), σ(t, c
0
t , ct)− σ
′(t, c0′t , c
′
t)),
∂xf(t) := ∂xf(t,X
′
t, c
0
t , ct)− ∂xf
′
(t,X ′t, c
0′
t , c
′
t),
G := G(X ′T , c
0
T , cT )−G
′(X ′T , c
0′
T , c
′
T ) ,
and ∆ξ := ξ − ξ′, ∆Xt := Xt −X
′
t and similarly for the other variables.
Proof. Let us put ∆B(t) := B(t, Yt, c
0
t , ct) − B(t, Y
′
t , c
0
t , ct), ∆∂xf(t) := ∂xf(t,Xt, c
0
t , ct) −
∂xf(t,X
′
t, c
0
t , ct) and ∆G := G(XT , c
0
T , cT )−G(X
′
T , c
0
T , cT ). We get by Itoˆ’s formula that
E
[
〈∆XT ,∆G+G〉
]
= E
[
〈∆ξ,∆Y0〉+
∫ T
0
(
〈−∂xf(t),∆Xt〉+ 〈B(t),∆Yt〉
+〈σ0(t),∆Z
0
t 〉+ 〈σ(t),∆Zt〉+
(
〈−∆∂xf(t),∆Xt〉+ 〈∆B(t),∆Yt〉
))
dt
]
.
Using (4.3), we obtain
γE
[
|∆XT |
2 +
∫ T
0
|∆Xt|
2dt
]
≤ E
[
〈∆ξ,∆Y0〉 − 〈∆XT , G〉
+
∫ T
0
(
〈−∂xf(t),∆Xt〉+ 〈B(t),∆Yt〉+ 〈σ0(t),∆Z
0
t 〉+ 〈σ(t),∆Zt〉
)
dt
]
. (4.9)
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On the other hand, the standard estimates for Lipschitz SDEs and BSDEs give
E
[
sup
t∈[0,T ]
|∆Yt|
2 +
∫ T
0
(|∆Z0t |
2 + |∆Zt|
2)dt
]
≤ CE
[
|G|2 +
∫ T
0
|∂xf(t)|
2dt
]
+ CE
[
|∆XT |
2 +
∫ T
0
|∆Xt|
2dt
]
, (4.10)
E
[
sup
t∈[0,T ]
|∆Xt|
2
]
≤ CE
[
|∆ξ|2 +
∫ T
0
[
|B(t)|2 + |σ0(t)|
2 + |σ(t)|2
]
dt
]
+ CE
∫ T
0
|∆Yt|
2dt .
Combining the above inequalities (4.9) and (4.10) gives
E
[
sup
t∈[0,T ]
|∆Xt|
2 + sup
t∈[0,T ]
|∆Yt|
2 +
∫ T
0
(|∆Z0t |
2 + |∆Zt|
2)dt
]
≤ CE
[
|∆ξ|2 + |G|2 +
∫ T
0
[
|∂xf(t)|
2 + |B(t)|2 + |σ0(t)|
2 + |σ(t)|2
]
dt
]
+E
[
〈∆ξ,∆Y0〉 − 〈∆XT , G〉+
∫ T
0
[
〈−∂xf(t),∆Xt〉+ 〈B(t),∆Yt〉+ 〈σ0(t),∆Z
0
t 〉+ 〈σ(t),∆Zt〉
]
dt
]
.
Now simple application of Young’s inequality establishes the claim.
Corollary 4.1. Under Assumptions (MFG-a,b,c1), the solution (X,Y,Z0, Z) to the FBSDE
(4.1) satisfies the following estimate:
E
[
sup
t∈[0,T ]
|Xt|
2 + sup
t∈[0,T ]
|Yt|
2 +
∫ T
0
(|Z0t |
2 + |Zt|
2)dt
]
≤ CE
[
|ξ|2 + |∂xg(0, c
0
T , cT )|
2
+
∫ T
0
(
|∂xf(t, 0, c
0
t , ct)|
2 + |l(t, 0, c0t , ct)|
2 + |(σ0, σ)(t, c
0
t , ct)|
2
)
dt
]
,
where C is a constant depending only on T, δ and Lipschitz constants of the system.
Proof. By quick inspection of the proof for Proposition 4.1, one can confirm that as long as
there exists a solution (X ′, Y ′, Z0′, Z ′) ∈ S2 × S2 × H2 × H2, their coefficients need not sat-
isfy Assumption (MFG-a,b,c1). In particular, by putting ξ′ and (l′, σ′0, σ
′, f
′
, g′) all zero, we
have a trivial solution (X ′, Y ′, Z0
′
, Z ′) = (0, 0, 0, 0). The desired estimate now follows from
Proposition 4.1.
Securities of maturity T with exogenously specified payoff
If we consider the exchange markets of bonds and futures, or other financial derivatives with
maturity T , those securities cease to exist at T after paying exogenously specified amount of
cash c0T . In this case, it is natural to consider with δ = 0 and
g(x, c0) = g(x, c0) := −〈c0, x〉 , (4.11)
since there is no reason to put penalty on the outstanding volume at T . In this case, the terminal
function g in (4.11) does not have the strict convexity. Fortunately, even in this case, we can
prove the unique existence as well as the stability result of the same form.
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Assumption 4.3. (MFG-c2)
(i) The functions f , σ0 and σ are independent of the argument ̟.
(ii) For any t ∈ [0, T ], any random variables x, x′, c0, c ∈ L2(F ;Rn) and any sub-σ-field G ⊂ F ,
the function l satisfies the monotone condition:
E
[
〈l(t,E[x|G], c0, c) − l(t,E[x′|G], c0, c), x − x′〉
]
≥ 0 .
(iii) γ := γf is strictly positive and the terminal function g is given by (4.11) with δ = 0.
Theorem 4.3. Under Assumptions (MFG-a,b,c2), there exists a unique strong solution (X,Y,Z0, Z) ∈
S
2(F1;Rn)×S2(F1;Rn)×H2(F1;Rn×d
0
)×H2(F1;Rn×d) to the FBSDE (4.1). Moreover, the same
form of stability and L2 estimates given in Proposition 4.1 and Corollary 4.1 holds.
Proof. Note that, in this case, the terminal condition for the BSDE is independent of XT . Thus,
as in Theorem 2.3 [23], we put y̺T = YT = −c
0
T in (4.4) and (4.5), respectively. Using the fact
that 〈∆XT ,∆YT 〉 = 0, one can follow the same arguments to get the desired result. The proof
of the stability result can also be done in almost exactly the same way.
5 Asymptotic Market Clearing
We are now ready to investigate if our FBSDE (4.1) actually provides a good approximate of
the market price and if so, how accurate it is. By Theorem 3.1, if we use (−E
[
Yt|F
0
t
]
)t∈[0,T ]
as the input (̟t)t∈[0,T ], where (Yt)t∈[0,T ] is the unique solution to the FBSDE (4.1) with the
convention ξ = ξ1 and c = c1, the optimal strategy of the individual agent is given by
α̂imf(t) := α̂(Y
i
t ,−E[Yt|F
0
t ]) = −Λ(Y
i
t − E[Yt|F
0
t ]) (5.1)
where (Y it )t∈[0,T ] is the solution to (3.4) with (̟t = −E
[
Yt|F
0
t
]
)t∈[0,T ].
Theorem 5.1. If the conditions for Theorem 4.1, Theorem 4.2 or Theorem 4.3 are satisfied
then we have
lim
N→∞
E
∫ T
0
∣∣∣ 1
N
N∑
i=1
α̂imf(t)
∣∣∣2dt = 0 .
Moreover if there exists some constant Γ such that supt∈[0,T ] E
[
|Yt|
q
] 1
q ≤ Γ <∞ for some q > 4,
then there exists some constant C independent of N such that
E
∫ T
0
∣∣∣ 1
N
N∑
i=1
α̂imf(t)
∣∣∣2dt ≤ CΓ2ǫN , (5.2)
where ǫN := N
−2/max(n,4)
(
1 + log(N)1{n=4}
)
.
Proof. Let us consider the following set of FBSDEs with 1 ≤ i ≤ N on the filtered probability
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space (Ω,F ,P;F) constructed in Section 2.
dX it =
(
−Λ(Y it − E[Y
i
t|F
0
t ]) + l(t,−E[Y
i
t|F
0
t ], c
0
t , c
i
t)
)
dt
+σ0(t,−E[Y
i
t|F
0
t ], c
0
t , c
i
t)dW
0
t + σ(t,−E[Y
i
t|F
0
t ], c
0
t , c
i
t)dW
i
t ,
dY it = −∂xf(t,X
i
t,−E[Y
i
t|F
0
t ], c
0
t , c
i
t)dt+ Z
i,0
t dW
0
t + Z
i
tdW
i
t ,
with Xi0 = ξ
i and Y iT = δ/(1 − δ)E[∂xg(X
i
T , c
0
T , c
i
T )|F
0
T ] + ∂xg(X
i
T , c
0
T , c
i
T ). Thanks to the
existence of unique strong solution, Yamada-Watanabe Theorem for FBSDEs (see, Theorem
1.33 [8]), there exists some measurable function Φ such that for every 1 ≤ i ≤ N ,
(X it, Y
i
t)t∈[0,T ] = Φ
(
(c0t )t∈[0,T ], (W
0
t )t∈[0,T ], ξ
i, (cit)t∈[0,T ], (W
i
t )t∈[0,T ]
)
.
Hence, conditionally on F
0
, the set of proceses (X it, Y
i
t)t∈[0,T ] with 1 ≤ i ≤ N are independently
and identically distributed. In particular, we have P-a.s.
E[Y it|F
0
t ] = E[Yt|F
0
t ], ∀t ∈ [0, T ],
E[∂xg(X
i
T , c
0
T , c
i
T )|F
0
T ] = E[∂xg(XT , c
0
T , cT )|F
0
T ] . (5.3)
Note that, under the convention ξ1 = ξ and c1 = c, we actually have (X1, Y 1) = (X,Y ). From
(5.3), we conclude that (Xit , Y
i
t , Z
i,0
t , Z
i
t)t∈[0,T ] = (X
i
t, Y
i
t, Z
i,0
t , Z
i
t)t∈[0,T ] in S
2(Fi) × S2(Fi) ×
H
2(Fi)×H2(Fi). Therefore,
1
N
N∑
i=1
α̂imf(t) = −Λ
( 1
N
N∑
i=1
Y it − E[Y
1
t |F
0
t ]
)
. (5.4)
We can easily check that
E
[
W2
( 1
N
N∑
i=1
δY it
,L(Y 1t |F
0
t )
)2∣∣∣F0t ] ≤ 2N
N∑
i=1
E
[
|Y it|
2|F
0
t
]
+ 2E
[
|Y 1t |
2|F
0
t
]
= 4E
[
|Y 1t |
2|F
0
t
]
.
Since (Y it)1≤i≤N are F
0
t -conditionally independently and identically distributed and also Y
1 ∈
S
2, the same arguments leading to (2.14) in [8] imply that the pointwise convergence holds:
lim
N→∞
E
[
W2
( 1
N
N∑
i=1
δY it
,L(Y 1t |F
0
t )
)2]
= 0 . (5.5)
We are now going to show that the set of functions, (fN )N∈N defined by
[0, T ] ∋ t 7→ fN(t) := E
[
W2
(
µt, µt
)2]
∈ R
with µt :=
1
N
∑N
i=1 δY it and µt := L(Y
1
t |F
0
t ) are compact in the set C([0, T ];R) endowed with
the topology of uniform convergence. In fact, uniformly in N ,
sup
t∈[0,T ]
|fN (t)| ≤ 4 sup
t∈[0,T ]
E
[
|Y 1t |
2
]
≤ C <∞ (5.6)
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where C is given by the estimate in Corollary 4.1. Moreover, for any 0 ≤ t, s ≤ T , Cauchy-
Schwarz, (5.6) and the triangular inequalities give
|fN (t)− fN(s)| ≤ E
[(
W2(µt, µt) +W2(µs, µ2)
)2] 1
2
E
[(
W2(µt, µt)−W2(µs, µ2)
)2] 1
2
≤ CE
[(
W2(µt, µt)−W2(µs, µs)
)2] 1
2
≤ CE
[
W2(µt, µs)
2 +W2(µt, µs)
2
] 1
2
.
≤ CE
[ 1
N
N∑
i=1
|Y it − Y
i
s|
2 + |Y 1t − Y
1
s|
2
] 1
2
≤ CE
[
|Y 1t − Y
1
s|
2
] 1
2 ,
uniformly in N , where we have used the fact that (Y i)i≥1 are conditionally i.i.d at the last
inequality. Since (Y 1t )t∈[0,T ] is a continuous process, the above estimate tells that (fN )N∈N
is equicontinuous, which is also uniformly equicontinuous since we are working on the finite
interval. Now, Arzela-Ascoli theorem implies the desired compactness.
Combining with the pointwise convergence (5.5), we thus conclude
lim
N→∞
sup
t∈[0,T ]
E
[
W2
( 1
N
N∑
i=1
δY it
,L(Y 1t |F
0
t )
)2]
= 0 . (5.7)
From the definition of Wasserstein distance (2.1), we have
∣∣∣ 1
N
N∑
i=1
Y it − E[Y
1
t |F
0
t ]
∣∣∣ ≤W1( 1
N
N∑
i=1
δY it
,L(Y 1t |F
0
t )
)
,
and hence, from (5.4),
E
∫ T
0
∣∣∣ 1
N
N∑
i=1
α̂imf(t)
∣∣∣2dt ≤ C sup
t∈[0,T ]
E
[
W2
( 1
N
N∑
i=1
δY it ,L(Y
1
t |F
0
t )
)2]
. (5.8)
The first conclusion now follows from (5.7). The latter claims directly follows from the expression
(5.8) and the (Fourth Step) in the proof of Theorem 2.12 in [8].
Theorem 5.1 justifies our intuitive understanding and a special type of FBSDEs (4.1) derived
in Section 3 as a reasonable model to approximate the market clearing price. When there exists
higher integrability, Glivenko-Cantelli convergence theorem in the Wasserstein distance even
provides a specific order ǫN of convergence in terms of the number of agents N (5.2). See
Theorem 5.8 and Remark 5.9 in [7] for more details.
Remark 5.1. Consider the situation treated in Theorem 4.3, for example, a market model of
a Futures contract. If the contract pays unit amount of the underlying asset per contract whose
value is exogenously given by c0T , our mean-field limit model (4.1) gives YT = −c
0
T . This means
that the modeled Futures price satisfies ̟T = −E[YT |F
0
T ] = c
0
T , which guarantees the convergence
of the modeled price to the value of the underlying asset at the maturity T . This is a crucially
important feature that any market model of this type of securities must satisfy.
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6 Extension to Multiple Populations
The main limitation of the last model is that there exists only one type of agents who share the
common cost functions as well as the coefficient functions for their state dynamics. Interest-
ingly, it is rather straightforward to extend the model to the situation with multiple populations,
where the agents in each population share the same cost and coefficient functions but they can
be different population by population. From the perspective of the practical applications, this
is a big advantage since we can analyze, for example, the interactions between the Sell-side and
Buy-side institutions for financial applications, or consumers and producers for economic appli-
cations. For general issues of mean field games as well as mean field type control problems in the
presence of multiple populations without common noise, see Fujii [13]. Although there exists a
common noise in the current model, the conditional law only enters as a form of expectation.
Therefore, as long as the system of FBSDEs is Lipschitz continuous, there exists a unique strong
solution at least for small T . For general T , although it is rather difficult to find appropriate
set of assumptions, it is still possible for some simple cases. In this section, our main task is to
find an appropriate limit model that extends (4.1) for multiple populations and the sufficient
conditions that make appropriate monotone conditions hold, which guarantees the existence of
unique solution.
In the following, we shall treat m populations indexed by p ∈ {1, · · · ,m}. For each
p, Np ≥ 1 agents are assumed to belong to the population. We denote by (p, i) the ith
agent in the population p. First, let us enlarge the probability space constructed in Sec-
tion 2. In addition to (Ω
0
,F
0
,P
0
;F
0
), we introduce (Ω
p,i
,F
p,i
,P
p,i
;P
p,i
) with 1 ≤ i ≤ Np
and 1 ≤ p ≤ m, each of which is generated by (ξp,i,W p,i) with d-dimensional Brownian motion
W
p,i and a W p,i-independent Rn-valued square integrable random variable ξp,i. For each p,
(ξp,i)
Np
i=1 are assumed to have the common law. We define (Ω
p,i,Fp,i,Pp,i;Fp,i) as the product of
(Ω
0
,F
0
,P
0
;F
0
) and (Ω
p,i
,F
p,i
,P
p,i
;P
p,i
). Finally (Ω,F ,P;F) is defined as a product of all the
spaces (Ω
0
,F
0
,P
0
;F
0
) and (Ω
p,i
,F
p,i
,P
p,i
;F
p,i
), 1 ≤ i ≤ Np, 1 ≤ p ≤ m, and (Ω
i,F i,Pi;Fi) as a
product of (Ω
0
,F
0
,P
0
;F
0
) and (Ω
p,i
,F
p,i
,P
p,i
;F
p,i
) with 1 ≤ p ≤ m. Every probability space is
assumed to be complete and every filtration is assumed to be complete and right-continuously
augmented to satisfy the usual conditions.
As we have done in Section 3, we first assume that the market price of n securities is given
exogenously by ̟t ∈ H
2(F
0
;Rn). Under this setup, we consider the control problem for each
(p, i) agent defined by
inf
α
p,i∈Ap,i
Jp,i(αp,i) , (6.1)
with
Jp,i(αp,i) := E
[∫ T
0
fp(t,X
p,i
t , α
p,i
t ,̟t, c
0
t , c
p,i
t )dt+ gp(X
p,i
T ,̟T , c
0
T , c
p,i
T )
]
,
subject to the dynamic constraint:
dXp,it =
(
αp,it + lp(t,̟t, c
0
t , c
p,i
t )
)
dt+ σp,0(t,̟t, c
0
t , c
p,i
t )dW
0
t + σp(t,̟t, c
0
t , c
p,i
t )dW
p,i
t
with Xp,i0 = ξ
p,i. As before we assume (c0t )t≥0 ∈ H
2(F
0
;Rn) and (cp,it )t≥0 ∈ H
2(F
p,i
;Rn). In
16
addition, within each population p, the random sources (cp,it )t≥0 are assumed to have a common
law 1 ≤ i ≤ Np. Admissible strategies A
p,i is the space H2(Fp,i;Rn). The measurable functions
fp : [0, T ]× (R
n)5 → R, gp : (R
n)4 → R, fp : [0, T ]× (R
n)4 → R and gp : (R
n)3 → R are given by
fp(t, x, α,̟, c
0, c) := 〈̟,α〉+
1
2
〈α,Λpα〉 + fp(t, x,̟, c
0, c) ,
gp(x,̟, c
0, c) := −δ〈̟,x〉 + gp(x, c
0, c) .
Assumption 6.1. (MFG-A) We assume the following conditions uniformly in p ∈ {1, · · · ,m}.
(i) Λp is a positive definite n × n symmetric matrix with λIn×n ≤ Λp ≤ λIn×n in the sense of
2nd-order form where λ and λ are some constants satisfying 0 < λ ≤ λ.
(ii) For any (t, x,̟, c0, c),
|fp(t, x,̟, c
0, c)| + |gp(x, c
0, c)| ≤ L(1 + |x|2 + |̟|2 + |c0|2 + |c|2) .
(iii) fp and gp are continuously differentiable in x and satisfy, for any (t, x, x
′,̟, c0, c),
|∂xfp(t, x
′,̟, c0, c)− ∂xfp(t, x,̟, c
0, c)| + |∂xgp(x
′, c0, c) − ∂xgp(x, c
0, c)| ≤ L|x′ − x| ,
and |∂xfp(t, x,̟, c
0, c)| + |∂xgp(x, c
0, c)| ≤ L(1 + |x|+ |̟|+ |c0|+ |c|).
(iv)The functions fp and gp are convex in x in the sense that for any (t, x, x
′,̟, c0, c),
fp(t, x
′,̟, c0, c) − fp(t, x,̟, c
0, c) − 〈x′ − x, ∂xfp(t, x,̟, c
0, c)〉 ≥
γf
2
|x′ − x|2 ,
gp(x
′, c0, c)− gp(x, c
0, c)− 〈x′ − x, ∂xgp(x, c
0, c)〉 ≥
γg
2
|x′ − x|2 ,
with some constants γf , γg ≥ 0.
(v) lp, σp,0, σp are the measurable functions defined on [0, T ] × (R
n)3 and are Rn,Rn×d
0
and
R
n×d-valued, respectively. Moreover they satisfy the linear growth condition:
|(lp, σp,0, σp)(t,̟, c
0, c)| ≤ L(1 + |̟|+ |c0|+ |c|)
for any (t,̟, c0, c).
(vi) δ ∈ [0, 1) is a given constant.
Under Assumption (MFG-A), Theorem 3.1 guarantees that the control problem (6.1) for
each agent (p, i) is uniquely characterized by
dXp,it =
(
α̂p(Y
p,i
t ,̟t) + lp(t,̟t, c
0
t , c
p,i
t )
)
dt+ σp,0(t,̟t, c
0
t , c
p,i
t )dW
0
t + σp(t,̟t, c
0
t , c
p,i
t )dW
p,i
t ,
dY p,it = −∂xfp(t,X
p,i
t ,̟t, c
0
t , c
p,i
t )dt+ Z
p,i,0
t dW
0
t + Z
p,i
t dW
p,i
t , (6.2)
with Xp,i0 = ξ
p,i and Y p,iT = −δ̟T+∂xgp(X
p,i
T , c
0
T , c
p,i
T ). We have defined α̂p(y,̟) := −Λp(y+̟)
and Λp := (Λp)
−1 as before. There exists a unique strong solution (Xp,it , Y
p,i
t , Z
p,i,0
t , Z
p,i
t )t∈[0,T ] ∈
S
2(Fp,i;Rn) × S2(Fp,i;Rn) × H2(Fp,i;Rn×d
0
) × H2(Fp,i;Rn×d), and the optimal trading strategy
for the agent (p, i) is given by
α̂p,it = α̂p(Y
p,i
t ,̟t) ,∀t ∈ [0, T ].
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Let us check the market clearing condition under this setup. In order to balance the demand
and supply of securities at the exchange, we need to have
∑m
p=1
∑Np
i=1 α̂(Y
p,i
t ,̟t) = 0. This
requires the market price to satisfy
̟t = −
( m∑
p=1
npΛp
)−1 m∑
p=1
npΛp
( 1
Np
Np∑
i=1
Y p,it
)
,
where N =
∑m
p=1Np and np := Np/N . At the moment, this is inconsistent to the initial
assumption that requires (̟t)t≥0 to be F
0
-adapted. However, since for each 1 ≤ p ≤ m,
(Y p,it )
Np
i=1 are F
0
-conditionally independently and identically distributed, we may follow the same
arguments used in Section 3. If we take N → ∞ while keeping the relative size of populations
np constant, we can expect to obtain
̟t = −Ξˆ
m∑
p=1
ΛˆpE[Y
p,1
t |F
0
t ] (6.3)
in the large population limit where
Λˆp := npΛp, Ξˆ :=
( m∑
p=1
Λˆp
)−1
.
Remark 6.1. When Λp = Λ for every population p, one can easily check that (6.3) becomes
̟t = −
m∑
p=1
npE[Y
p,1
t |F
0
t ] .
Since Y of the adjoint equation represents the marginal cost i.e., the first order derivative of
the value function with respect to the state variable x, the above expression of ̟ implies that
the market price may be given by the population-weighted average of the marginal benefit (-cost)
across the entire populations.
6.1 Limit problem with multiple populations
By the observation we have just made, we are motivated to study the following limit problem
with 1 ≤ p ≤ m:
dXpt =
(
α̂p
(
Y pt ,̟(E[Yt|F
0
t ])
)
+ lp
(
t,̟(E[Yt|F
0
t ]), c
0
t , c
p
t
))
dt
+σp,0
(
t,̟(E[Yt|F
0
t ]), c
0
t , c
p
t
)
dW 0t + σp
(
t,̟(E[Yt|F
0
t ]), c
0
t , c
p
t
)
dW p,1t ,
dY pt = −∂xfp
(
t,Xpt ,̟(E[Yt|F
0
t ]), c
0
t , c
p
t
)
dt+ Zp,0t dW
0
t + Z
p
t dW
p,1
t , (6.4)
with Xp0 = ξ
p and
Y pT =
δ
1− δ
Ξˆ
m∑
p=1
ΛˆpE
[
∂xgp(X
p
T , c
0
T , c
p
T )|F
0
T
]
+ ∂xgp(X
p
T , c
0
T , c
p
T ) .
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We put as before ξp := ξp,1 and cp := cp,1 to lighten the notation. Here,
̟(E[Yt|F
0
t ]) := −Ξˆ
m∑
p=1
ΛˆpE[Y
p
t |F
0
t ], α̂p(y,̟) := −Λp(y +̟)
and hence (6.4) is actually an m-coupled system of FBSDEs of McKean-Vlasov type. One can
derive the terminal condition from
Y pT = −δ̟(E[YT |F
0
T ]) + ∂xgp(X
p
T , c
0
T , c
p
T ) , (6.5)
by summing over 1 ≤ p ≤ m after taking conditional expectation given F
0
T . In the following,
we use the notation
(Xt, Yt, Z
0
t , Zt)t∈[0,T ] =
(
(Xpt )
m
p=1, (Y
p
t )
m
p=1, (Z
p,0
t )
m
p=1, (Z
p
t )
m
p=1
)
t∈[0,T ]
. (6.6)
6.2 Solvability for small T
For small T , Lipschitz continuity suffices to guarantee the existence of a unique solution.
Assumption 6.2. (MFG-B)
Uniformly in p ∈ {1, · · · ,m}, for any (t, x, c0, c) ∈ [0, T ] × (Rn)3 and any ̟,̟′ ∈ Rn, the
coefficient functions lp, σp,0, σp and fp satisfy
|(lp, σp,0, σp)(t,̟, c
0, c)− (lp, σp,0, σp)(t,̟
′, c0, c)|
+|∂xfp(t, x,̟, c
0, c) − ∂xfp(t, x,̟
′, c0, c)| ≤ L|̟ −̟′| .
The following theorem follows exactly in the same way as Theorem 4.1.
Theorem 6.1. Under Assumptions (MFG-A,B), there exists some constant τ > 0 which de-
pends only on (L, δ, np,Λp) such that for any T ≤ τ , there exists a unique strong solution
(X,Y,Z0, Z) ∈ S2
(
F
1; (Rn)m
)
× S2
(
F
1; (Rn)m
)
× H2
(
F
1; (Rn×d
0
)m
)
× H2
(
F
1; (Rn×d)m
)
to the
FBSDE (6.4).
Remark 6.2. Note that the above system of FBSDEs becomes a linear-quadratic form by choos-
ing (lp, σp,0, σp, fp, gp) appropriately. In this case, the problem reduces to solving ordinary dif-
ferential equations of Riccati type. Therefore, the existence of a solution for a given T can be
tested, at lest numerically, by checking the absence of a “blow up” in its solution.
6.3 Solvability for general T
We now move on to the existence result of a unique solution for general T . It is very difficult to
find general existence criteria for fully-coupled multi-dimensional FBSDEs. A the moment, in
order to apply well-known Peng-Wu’s method, let us put the following simplifying assumptions.
Assumption 6.3. (MFG-C1)
(i) For every 1 ≤ p ≤ m, the functions fp, lp, σp,0 and σp are independent of the argument ̟.
(ii) Λp=Λ and np = 1/m for every p.
(iii) There exists a strictly positive constant γ with 0 < γ ≤ γf ∧ γg. Moreover, the functions
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(gp)
m
p=1 satisfy for any x
p, xp′, c0, cp ∈ L2(F ;Rn) and any sub-σ-field G ⊂ F ,
δ
1− δ
m−1E
[〈 m∑
p=1
E[∂xgp(x
p, c0, cp)− ∂xgp(x
p′, c0, cp)|G],
m∑
p=1
(xp − xp′)
〉]
+γg
m∑
p=1
E[|xp − xp′|2] ≥ γ
m∑
p=1
E[|xp − xp′|2] .
Remark 6.3. The condition (iii) in the above assumption is rather restrictive. However, since
we are assuming ∂xgp is Lipschitz continuous in x, the absolute value of the first term is bounded
by
δ
1− δ
max((Lp)
m
p=1)
m∑
p=1
E|xp − xp′|2
where the Lp is the Lipschitz constant for ∂xgp. This means if δ is sufficiently small the condition
(iii) is satisfied. As a special case, one may consider a ̟-independent terminal cost g.
The next result is the counterpart of Theorem 4.2.
Theorem 6.2. Under Assumptions (MFG-A,B,C1), there exists a unique strong solution (X,Y,Z0, Z) ∈
S
2
(
F
1; (Rn)m
)
× S2
(
F
1; (Rn)m
)
× H2
(
F
1; (Rn×d
0
)m
)
× H2
(
F
1; (Rn×d)m
)
to the FBSDE (6.4).
Moreover, the same form of stability and L2 estimates given in Proposition 4.1 and Corollary 4.1
holds.
Proof. Under Assumption (MFG-C1), (6.4) can be written as
dXpt =
(
−Λ
(
Y pt −
1
m
m∑
p=1
E[Y pt |F
0
t ]
)
+ lp(t, c
0
t , c
p
t )
)
dt+ σp,0(t, c
0
t , c
p
t )dW
0
t + σp(t, c
0
t , c
p
t )dW
p,1
t ,
dY pt = −∂xfp(t,X
p
t , c
0
t , c
p
t )dt+ Z
p,0
t dW
0
t + Z
p
t dW
p,1
t ,
with Xp0 = ξ
p and
Y pT =
δ
1− δ
1
m
m∑
p=1
E
[
∂xgp(X
p
T , c
0
T , c
p
T )|F
0
T
]
+ ∂xgp(X
p
T , c
0
T , c
p
T ) .
For each p, let us define the functionals Bp, Gp for any y
p, xp, cp, c ∈ L2(F ;Rn) with y := (yp)mp=1
and x := (xp)mp=1 by
Bp(t, y, c
0, c) :=
(
−Λ
(
yp −
1
m
m∑
p=1
E[yp|F
0
t ]
)
+ lp(t, c
0, cp)
)
Gp(x, c
0, c) :=
δ
1− δ
1
m
m∑
p=1
E[∂xgp(x
p, c0, cp)|F
0
T ] + ∂xgp(x
p, c0, cp) ,
and set B(t, y, c0, c) := (Bp(t, y, c
0, c))mp=1 and G(x, c
0, c) := (Gp(x, c
0, c))mp=1.
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With ∆y := y − y′ and ∆x := x− x′, we have
E
[
〈B(t, y, c0, c)−B(t, y′, c0, c),∆y〉
]
:=
m∑
p=1
E
[
〈Bp(t, y, c
0, c)−Bp(t, y
′, c0, c),∆yp〉
]
= −
m∑
p=1
E[〈∆yp,Λ∆yp〉] +
1
m
E
[
〈
m∑
p=1
E[∆yp|F
0
t ],Λ
m∑
p=1
∆yp〉
]
≤ 0 . (6.7)
The last inequality can be checked in the following way. There exists a orthogonal matrix P
such that P⊤ΛP becomes diagonal. Then working on the new basis yˆp = P⊤∆yp, 1 ≤ p ≤ m,
the last inequality of (6.7) can be confirmed component by component 1 ≤ i ≤ n by the fact
(
m∑
p=1
yˆpi )
2 ≤ m
m∑
p=1
|yˆpi |
2 .
From (MFG-A)(iv) and (MFG-C1)(iii), we immediately get
E
[
〈G(x, c0, c)−G(x′, c0, c),∆x〉
]
:=
m∑
p=1
E
[
〈Gp(x, c
0, c)−Gp(x
′, y, c),∆xp〉
]
≥ γE[|∆x|2] .
The following inequality also follows directly from (MFG-A)(iv)
E
[
〈−
(
∂xf(t, x, c
0, c) − ∂xf(t, x
′, c0, c)
)
,∆x〉
]
:=
m∑
p=1
[
〈−
(
∂xfp(t, x
p, c0, cp)− ∂xfp(t, x
p′, c0, cp)
)
,∆xp〉
]
≤ −γE[|∆x|2] . (6.8)
Now we have established the monotone conditions corresponding to (4.3) for the current model.
We can now repeat the same procedures in the proof of Theorem 4.2 and Proposition 4.1.
We give the corresponding results for the securities of maturity T with exogenously specified
payoff.
Assumption 6.4. (MFG-C2)
(i) For every 1 ≤ p ≤ m, the functions fp, lp, σp,0 and σp are independent of the argument ̟.
(ii) Λp=Λ and np = 1/m for every p.
(iii) γ := γf is strictly positive. Moreover, δ = 0 and the terminal function gp is given by
gp(x, c
0) = gp(x, c
0) := −〈c0, x〉 (6.9)
for every 1 ≤ p ≤ m.
Theorem 6.3. Under Assumptions (MFG-A,B,C2), there exists a unique strong solution (X,Y,Z0, Z) ∈
S
2
(
F
1; (Rn)m
)
× S2
(
F
1; (Rn)m
)
× H2
(
F
1; (Rn×d
0
)m
)
× H2
(
F
1; (Rn×d)m
)
to the FBSDE (6.4).
Moreover, the same form of the stability and L2 estimates given in Proposition 4.1 and Corol-
lary 4.1 holds.
Proof. Using the inequalities (6.7) and (6.8) with
∑m
p=1〈∆X
p
T ,∆Y
p
T 〉 = 0, we can follow the
same arguments in the proof of Theorem 4.3.
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6.4 Asymptotic market clearing for multi-population model
At the last part of this section, we investigate the asymptotic market clearing in the presence of
multiple populations. As in Section 5, we define (̟t)t∈[0,T ] using the solution to the system of
the mean-field FBSDEs:
̟t = ̟(E[Yt|F
0
t ]) := −Ξˆ
m∑
p=1
ΛˆpE
[
Y pt |F
0
t
]
where (Y pt )
m
p=1 is the solution of (6.4). In order to test the accuracy of the above (̟t)t∈[0,T ] as a
market clearing price, we solve the individual agent problem (6.1) with this ̟ as an input. The
corresponding individual problem (6.1) for the agent (p, i) is given by the unique strong solution
(Xp,i, Y p,i, Zp,i,0, Zp,i) of (6.2). The optimal strategy for the agent (p, i) is then given by
α̂p,imf(t) := −Λp
(
Y p,it − Ξˆ
m∑
q=1
ΛˆqE
[
Y qt |F
0
t
])
,∀t ∈ [0, T ] .
Theorem 6.4. If the conditions for Theorem 6.1, Theorem 6.2 or Theorem 6.3 are satisfied
then we have
lim
N→∞
E
∫ T
0
∣∣∣ 1
N
m∑
p=1
Np∑
i=1
α̂p,imf(t)
∣∣∣2dt = 0 ,
where N :=
∑m
p=1Np and the limit is taken while keeping (np := Np/N)1≤p≤m constant. More-
over if there exists some constant Γ such that supt∈[0,T ] E
[
|Yt|
q
] 1
q ≤ Γ <∞ for some q > 4, then
there exists some constant C independent of N such that
E
∫ T
0
∣∣∣ 1
N
m∑
p=1
Np∑
i=1
α̂p,imf(t)
∣∣∣2dt ≤ CΓ2ǫN ,
where ǫN := N
−2/max(n,4)
(
1 + log(N)1{n=4}
)
.
Proof. By the definition of α̂p,imf , we have
1
N
m∑
p=1
Np∑
i=1
α̂p,imf(t) = −
1
N
m∑
p=1
Np∑
i=1
Λp
(
Y p,it − Ξˆ
m∑
q=1
ΛˆqE[Y
q
t |F
0
t ]
)
= −
m∑
p=1
Λˆp
( 1
Np
Np∑
i=1
Y p,it − E[Y
p
t |F
0
t ]
)
. (6.10)
On the other hand, we have for each 1 ≤ p ≤ m, 1 ≤ i ≤ Np,
dXp,it =
(
α̂p
(
Y p,it ,̟(E[Yt|F
0
t ])
)
+ lp
(
t,̟(E[Yt|F
0
t ]), c
0
t , c
p,i
t
))
dt
+σp,0
(
t,̟(E[Yt|F
0
t ]), c
0
t , c
p,i
t
)
dW 0t + σp
(
t,̟(E[Yt|F
0
t ]), c
0
t , c
p,i
t
)
dW p,it ,
dY p,it = −∂xfp
(
t,Xp,it ,̟(E[Yt|F
0
t ]), c
0
t , c
p,i
t
)
dt+ Zp,i,0t dW
0
t + Z
p,i
t dW
p,i
t ,
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with Xp,i0 = ξ
p,i,
Y p,iT = −δ̟(E[YT |F
0
T ]) + ∂xgp(X
p,i
T , c
0
T , c
p,i
T ) .
By the unique strong solvability, Yamada-Watanabe theorem implies that there exists some
function Φp for each 1 ≤ p ≤ m such that for every 1 ≤ i ≤ Np,
(Y p,it )t∈[0,T ] = Φp
(
c0, (W 0t )t∈[0,T ], (E[Y
q
t |F
0
t ]t∈[0,T ])1≤q≤m, ξ
p,i, (cp,it )t∈[0,T ], (W
p,i
t )t∈[0,T ]
)
.
Hence (Y p,it )t∈[0,T ],1≤i≤Np are independently and identically distributed conditionally on F
0
. In
particular, we have E[Y p,it |F
0
t ] = E[Y
p,1
t |F
0
t ].
We now compare (Xp,1t , Y
p,1
t , Z
p,1,0
t , Z
p,1
t )t∈[0,T ] with (X
p
t , Y
p
t , Z
p,0
t , Z
p
t )t∈[0,T ] by treating̟(E[Yt|F
0
t ])
as external inputs. Note that the terminal condition of the latter satisfies the relation (6.5).
Then the standard stability result of the Lipschitz FBSDEs implies (Y p,1t )t∈[0,T ] = (Y
p
t )t∈[0,T ] in
S
2(Fp,1;Rn). As a result we have obtained E[Y pt |F
0
t ] = E[Y
p,1
t |F
0
t ]. Using the expression (6.10),
we obtain
1
N
m∑
p=1
Np∑
i=1
α̂p,imf(t) = −
m∑
p=1
Λˆp
( 1
Np
Np∑
i=1
Y p,it − E[Y
p,1
t |F
0
t ]
)
.
We can now repeat the last part of the proof for Theorem 5.1.
7 Concluding Remarks and Further Extensions
In this work, we have studied endogenous formation of market clearing price using a stylized
model of a security exchange. We have derived a special type of FBSDE of McKean-Vlasov
type with common noise whose solution provides a good approximate of the equilibrium price.
In addition to the existence of strong unique solution to the FBSDE, we have proved that the
modeled price asymptotically clear the market in the large N -limit. We also gave the order of
convergence ǫN when the solution of the FBSDE possesses higher order of integrability. In the
following, let us list up of a further extension of our technique and some interesting topics for
future projects:
• Dependence on the conditional law of the state: For applications to energy and com-
modity markets, or economic models with producers and consumers, one may want to study the
cost functions (f , g) depending on the empirical distribution of the sate X of the agents such
as f
(
t,Xit ,
1
N
∑N
j=1 δXjt
,̟t, c
0
t , c
i
t
)
. Under the setup with conditional independence, the cost
function for the limit problem is naturally given by
f
(
t,Xt,L(Xt|F
0
t ),̟t, c
0
t , ct
)
.
Even in this case, the resultant FBSDE (4.1) is solvable, at least for small T , if (∂xf, ∂xg) are
Lipschitz continuous in the measure argument with respect to W2-distance. Under the stronger
assumption guaranteeing the monotone conditions (4.3), one can even achieve the existence
of unique solution in general T . As long as the source of common noise is solely from the
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filtration F
0
generated by W 0, we can avoid subtleties regarding the admissibility (so-called
H-hypothesis). See Remark 2.10 in [8] as a useful summary for this issue.
• Explicit solution: If we chose f , g as quadratic functions and l, σ0, σ as affine functions,
we obtain a linear-quadratic mean field game with common noise. In this case, an explicit so-
lution may be available where the coefficients functions are given as the solutions to differential
equations of Riccati type.
• Property of market price process: It seems interesting to study the properties of the
market clearing price theoretically and numerically. For example, if n = d0 the equivalent
martingale measure (EMM) can be uniquely determined. Based on the payoff distribution c0
and the cost functions of the agents (f, g), one may study how the market price process under
the EMM behaves, for example, the relation between the skew of its implied volatility and the
risk-averseness of the agents.
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